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A secure communication between company sites and gov-
ernment agencies is often realized by virtual private net-
works (VPNs), connecting internal networks over untrust-
worthy networks, e.g., the Internet. Devices behind VPN
gateways transparently exchange information over crypto-
graphic tunnels. The deployed protocol assures the reali-
zation of confidentiality, integrity, and authentication.
Usually, theaccess toVPNs isorganizedby full-meshed
topologies or hub-and-spoke architectures. The latter
scheme is more common, as the VPN configuration is often
still done manually and it allows for dynamic participants
in a VPN. If hub-and-spoke architectures are infeasible for
bottleneck and availability reasons, two reasons speak
against a manual configuration: setup as well as mainte-
nance are time- and cost-intensive and the potential for
security-relevant errors increases significantly. Thus, sev-
eral approaches for the self-configuration of VPN emerged
[2].However,most dependoncentral entities. Furthermore,
none addresses tunnel-in-tunnel configurations, which are
required for advanced mobility support and Denial-of-Ser-
vice-resistant topologies. None of the systems assures the
same level of security as a proper manual configuration.
Incontrast,SecureOverLayfor IPsecDiscovery (SOLID)
[3] employs a self-maintaining VPN with distinct mechan-
isms for discovery, routing, and topology control. Espe-
cially the latter is important as the setup of VPN tunnels is
rather resource- and time-intensive (several seconds per
tunnel if smartcardsareused). Toefficiently search for gate-
ways within the VPN despite a low number of proactively
established tunnels, SOLID deploys well-understood con-
ceptsofpeer-topeeroverlays [4], [1] in IPsec infrastructures.
BasicApproach: SOLID’s topology control establishes
two IPsec associations to create a ring structure. As gate-
ways are ordered by their inner IP addresses, packet desti-
nations can be looked up easily. Additional cross connec-
tions assure a lookup in Ο(log n) steps. At first glance, this
does not differ much from Chord (apart from security ser-
vices). However, network addresses (i.e., the keys) are not
hashed due to variable subnet masks, and samples of the
address space areused toplan cross connections.
Complex Topologies: To allow nested topologies,
where gateways communicate over other gateways, SOLID
embeds the ring in more complex transport networks by
deploying tunnel-in-tunnel connections. In contrast to reg-
ular routingmechanisms no broadcast is used to find indir-
ect paths. If a connection is to be established, it will be
routedusing the existingoverlay topology first, i.e., theway
the search took. This path is optimized later by local infor-
mation, leading to optimal paths in common networks.
DoS resistance: The distributed self-configuration al-
lows to tolerate node failures and even react to them, e.g.,
data can be rerouted over other gateways. To prevent DoS
attacks on importantVPNparts administratorsmay further-
more separate them from less important ones.
Prototype and simulations (cmp. Fig. 1) verify that the
availability of VPN can be increased – without sacrificing
conventional security objectives – by performing a distrib-
uted self-configuration, with means to recover from network
partitions, to separate important VPN parts from less im-
portant, and to plan proactive backup paths. It is also
possible to reintegrate participants over different IP ad-
dresses quickly.
Fig. 1: SOLID operating environment: OMNeT++ simulation (left), VPN
visualization &monitoring (middle), and Linux embedded system
(right).
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